Chapter 137: Great Bombardment On The Western Front
Two flowers bloom, each branch tells its own story.
On the same day that the Great Bombardment of the military ports in the Black Sea Theater of the Eastern Front began, along the Belgian coast of the Western Front, Germania’s Airship Force and Coastal Defense Gun units had long been ready for action, preparing to unleash a long-suppressed assault.
Their targets were precisely the fleets moored in several military ports on the eastern shore of Britannia Main Island near the Strait of Dover.
Because the long-range bombing on the Western Front required even greater distances and higher flight altitudes, the Airship Force had to take off much earlier.
Most airships took off before midnight on the 27th, flying for over 6 hours over the North Sea before arriving at several ports on the eastern shore of Britannia Island just before dawn.
Such long-distance flights required allocating more airship payload to fuel, reducing the bomb load accordingly. Generally, for bombings within 200-plus kilometers one way on the Eastern Front, 5 tons of payload could be used for bombs, while Western Front bombings could carry at most 3 tons.
Longer distances also brought navigation difficulties and accumulated more errors; after flying a few hundred kilometers, deviation was at least tens of kilometers.
After dawn, they still had to slowly locate the port and readjust course to fly over it, wasting an extra half hour of precious daylight time compared to the Eastern Front, giving ground enemies more reaction time.
This half hour could be used to urgently raise steam on warships, launch combat reconnaissance aircraft for interception, or adjust anti-aircraft gun deployments.
Similarly, due to the excessive distance, Western Front bombings could not match the Eastern Front’s twice-daily frequency; the limit was once a day. If airship maintenance required more time, it might drop to once every few days.
Thus, the Airship Force bombings of ports on the Western Front were destined to be far less effective than on the Eastern Front. The Western Front was only suitable for aimless night random bombing or simply targeting large city-level objectives, where missing was no big deal.
But in any case, Germania’s upper echelons already felt the era’s pressure of “airship bombing about to be phased out,” so of course they wanted to squeeze out every last bit of value before it was.
In this operational plan, the Western Front’s 30 airships were also divided into two groups.
One group took off from Wilhelmshaven on the mainland, crossing 700 kilometers of the North Sea for over 7 hours total flight time, to attack Rosyth Port in southern Scotland. Part of the fast main fleet was moored there.
The other group took off from Zeebrugge Port in Belgium, about 200-plus kilometers to Harwich Port on the eastern shore of Britannia Island, where the North Sea Patrol Fleet was stationed.
Finally, there was a newly secretly built Coastal Defense Gun force, plus some temporarily brought-in railway guns, preparing to bombard Dover Port 38 kilometers away and adjacent Folkestone Anchorage from Cape Gris-Nez west of Calais Port across the strait.
This location was one of the Channel Fleet’s bases. Though the Channel Fleet’s main force usually hid in Southampton or Portsmouth, recent intelligence showed that to guard against further Channel infiltration by Germania Navy submarine forces, part of the Channel Fleet had been pulled to near Dover in recent days for heightened vigilance.
As for how the news of “Germania submarines planning to intensify Channel infiltration recently” leaked out, and whether it was deliberate fake intelligence without wires, that was unimportant.
Even if it was fake intelligence, it would be acted out convincingly. Germania Navy’s submarine force would really move toward Calais Port direction, attempt infiltration breakthroughs, and play the ruse to the hilt.
After all, even ordinary pubg players in later generations knew to act it out when using aimbot cheats.
……
At 5:30 a.m. on July 28, 15 airships that took off from the airship base at Zeebrugge Port in Belgium arrived first at Harwich Port on the eastern shore of Britannia Island.
Choosing Harwich Port had several advantages: first, shorter distance, fuel-efficient, allowing relatively more bombs; second, closer range meant less accumulated navigation error, so a few minutes after slight dawn, they could find the target and fly over to start bombing, maximizing suddenness.
The downside was Harwich Port had no big ships, mostly cruisers and destroyers, with the largest being ten-thousand-ton armored cruisers.
After all, this was a fleet responsible for North Sea sea control and hunting Germania destroyers and submarines, not for main fleet decisive battles.
The Airship Force members attacking Harwich Port mostly came from Württemberg Duchy and Duchy of Baden. Because the army occupying this coastal area was the German 4th Army Group, commanded by the Duke of Württemberg.
Air raid force members from the same duchies were easier to manage and integrate.
Hugo Speeler, lieutenant from Ludwigsburg in Württemberg Duchy, was one of this Airship Force, serving as observer on Airship L45.
As the ground gradually lit by dawn, observers on the 15 airships all scanned eagerly for ground targets. A few minutes later, Lieutenant Hugo Speeler first spotted and calculated the relative deviation.
“Report to the captain! Our airship has deviated northeast; target port area is southwest-west of us, bearing 243, distance 9 kilometers!”
The major captain of Airship L45 immediately raised his telescope toward the direction reported by Lieutenant Speeler and indeed saw the anchorage.
He immediately ordered the airship to turn and had the signalman flash the battlefield light signal “All ships follow me turning.”
This was also the most common order flashed when a comrade first spotted the target in airship group operations. It avoided the tedium of airborne radio and prevented radio wave signals from being intercepted by ground enemies.
The other 14 airships soon followed the instructions and flew over.
Knowing Harwich Port had no top-tier giants, the airship group carried only 500-kilogram aerial bombs this time, avoiding redundant lethality and insufficient quantity of 2000-kilogram ones.
500-kilogram bombs were lethal enough against light cruisers; against ten-thousand-ton armored cruisers, even if not sunk, they’d be heavily damaged. Destroyers would be instantly killed on any hit. Plus, with Harwich Port relatively close, each airship carried 8 500-kilogram bombs and 10 50-kilogram calibration small bombs.
Just 10 minutes later, the airship group reached directly over Harwich Port’s anchorage. Most warships hadn’t raised steam in time, but a few in patrol status used their recently installed shipboard anti-aircraft guns to desperately fire at the sky.
Britannians’ combat reconnaissance aircraft also began taking off.
The power of new Rolls-Royce aircraft engines far surpassed the shoddy junk from Lusha counterparts on the Eastern Front, boosting combat effectiveness, with service ceiling estimated near 3000 meters.
However, climbing to 3000 meters took considerable time; aircraft tired more as they climbed, and near 3000 meters, even at full power, they’d climb only one or two meters per second, taking 10 minutes for the last few hundred meters.
“Hurry before enemy planes climb up; maintain 3000 meters for calibration and bombing! Once enemy aircraft reach 2500 meters, climb immediately!”
Germania airships were very rational; seeing the enemy’s posture, they knew to seize the moment to attack.
The airship group swarmed toward the most conspicuous ten-thousand-ton armored cruiser mooring area. After scattering a few waves of 50-kilogram aerial bombs for fine calibration, 500-kilogram big bombs began falling like raindrops.
……
“Open fire now! Don’t let those airships get close!”
Below on the berths, the remaining three “Cressy-class” armored cruisers “Bacchus,” “Satalej River,” and “Euryalus” faced the oncoming airship group; all officers and men on the three ships fell into great fear but had to fire desperately.
As old armored cruisers built in the late 19th century, “Cressy-class” generally had 16 years’ service life. If judging only by main and secondary guns’ surface firepower, they weren’t inferior compared to other armored cruisers built in the following seven or eight years.
But in anti-aircraft and underwater protection, these ships were utter garbage—no depth charges, no armor against underwater attacks, only 3 76-millimeter guns for the whole ship. Even with hasty elevation modifications, only these 3 small-caliber guns could fire anti-air.
Such design let these ships merely pad numbers in surface gunnery duels but left them utterly helpless against aerial or underwater threats.
Just over a month after war broke out last year, the other three “Cressy-class,” including lead ship “Cressy,” were ambushed off Ostend Port in Belgium by Germania’s U-9 submarine.
One submarine firing all 6 carried torpedoes hit and sank 3 armored cruisers, totaling 37,500 tons sunk（”Cressy-class” each 12,500 tons）, a major miracle in naval battle history.
Now, the remaining three cruisers were placed at Harwich Port as backup against Germania light cruisers hunting near Dogger Bank.
But they never waited for Germania light cruisers’ rash advance, only for Germania airships’ arrival from above.
The three ships’ total 9 76-millimeter small tubes firing wildly anti-air looked so feeble, ultimately watching helplessly as 50-kilogram small bombs fell ever closer, smashing onto decks.
Ship hulls with almost no deck armor could be penetrated even by 50-kilogram small potatoes; the four big-sausage-like funnels sticking up from the deck had no protection and one was even blasted askew.
As 50-kilogram bombs exploded on deck, it meant 500-kilogram big bombs were coming soon.
Heavy bombs whistled through the sky, falling like rain from over 3000 meters; even with airships nearly hovering, it took an average 15 bombs to ensure one direct hit. Smaller warships were even harder.
“Left! A bit more right!” On L45, observer Lieutenant Hugo Speeler yelled hoarsely; helmsman and other crew worked diligently to adjust the airship.
But airships had large turning radii, unable to fine-tune sideways in air, only fore-aft.
Thus, in airship bombing of warships, flight paths often had a small angle to warship mooring orientation, allowing left-right fine-tune by advancing or reversing.
Fortunately, the elite operators followed these tactical points; after engine output fine-tune, the heavy bomb finally landed squarely on “Bacchus”‘s deck.
“Flight path should overlap the warship; hurry and drop more!”
Hugo Speeler quickly reported the observation to the captain, who decisively dumped all remaining bombs.
At such times, conserving bombs, seeking next targets, or recalibrating with small bombs was pure waste of time and opportunity!
For each airship in every heavy bomb raid, nailing one target was satisfying; then just dump as many as possible once locked.
Other targets, leave to friendly airships.
Ultimately, three full 500-kilogram aerial bombs, at over 200 meters per second descent speed, smashed through “Bacchus”‘s horizontal armor.
700 kilograms total TNT explosives blew the entire deck skyward; four big funnels were completely blasted into the sea.
Hull bottom torn open with two huge gashes, seawater surged in, immediately settling the 12,500-ton armored cruiser at her berth.
Sister ships “Satalej River” and “Euryalus” also received focused attention from other airships, but without Lieutenant Speeler’s airship’s precision, it took 3 waves and 6 airships’ firepower to sink the other two “Cressy-class” as well.
Seeing no more high-value targets in port, airships began randomly spraying bombs on light cruiser and destroyer berths, some bombing supply ships and oilers.
Port actually had a larger armored cruiser, the 1907-completed “Minotaur-class,” flagship of this cruiser fleet. Germania airships tried attacking it like the “Cressy-class.”
But “Minotaur-class” had fully 16 small-caliber 76-millimeter guns, wartime hastily modified for high elevation.
16 76mm guns’ firepower equaled 4 anti-aircraft gun companies, over 5 times “Cressy-class”!
In attempting to attack “Minotaur-class,” 2 airships were too aggressive, directly hit by shells, paying the price for underestimating.
But these two didn’t die in vain; crashing low, they dropped bombs precisely hitting “Minotaur” with multiple 500-kilogram bombs, one airship wreckage smashing directly onto her deck.
Fully sinking this 15,000-ton “near-dreadnought” armored cruiser peak.
After “Minotaur-class” lesson, airships dared not underestimate new warships with strong anti-air upgrades, only picking soft targets with few AA guns.
After sinking 1 more “Chatham-class” light cruiser and 2 destroyers, the airship squadron withdrew. Total 2 airships shot down, 2 damaged.
Shot-down ones were costs of risking “Minotaur-class.” Damaged were hit by stray bullets from enemy combat reconnaissance aircraft rear machine guns firing upward at max altitude, but damage minor, repairable.
……
The Harwich Port bombing ultimately caused Britannians losses of 4 armored cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers, total 7 warships. Being in port, ships could mostly be salvaged as scrap, personnel casualties relatively low.
Only “Bacchus” sunk by Hugo Speeler suffered secondary explosion, and “Minotaur-class” hit by multiple heavy bombs plus airship crash ignited full-ship fire from hydrogen remnants; these two ships killed over a thousand combined, most other crew escaped.
This air raid caused over 2100 Britannia Navy casualties; Germania lost 32 airship crew killed.
At the same time, the 15 airships bombing Rosyth Port（Edinburgh’s outer port, near the mouth of Edinburgh Bay） achieved far smaller results, as expected.
Excessive airship range caused huge accumulated error; by arrival over port, some warships were alerted and barely underway at low speed.
Compared to Eastern Front Lusha’s Black Sea Fleet, this showed Britannia Royal Navy had substance. Warships’ alertness was high; those in Rosyth Port even kept boilers on low pressure, avoiding full cold starts on attack.
On airship arrival over port, they faced more 76-millimeter anti-aircraft guns, forced high-altitude bombing throughout, but airship losses small, only 1 shot down.
But 3 other airships suffered storm or other mechanical failures; even limping back, they needed repairs, unusable short-term.
Bombing results: 15 airships dropped 90 500-kilogram aerial bombs and some calibration bombs total.
With many big targets in Rosyth Port, airships didn’t waste on small ships; split into two teams, they queued to concentrate on two battleships, barely calibrating.
Ultimately, most conspicuous moored “Neptune” battleship suffered 10 airships’ concentrated attack, 60 500-kilogram bombs dropped on her.
This battleship, laid down 1909, completed 1911, had design flaws: midships two main turrets back-to-back flanking main funnel.
Designed then to allow all main guns to fire one side with broad arcs.
Before “Neptune,” earlier Britannia battleships from “Dreadnought” to “Bellerophon-class” to “St. Vincent-class,” even with 10 guns, wasted 2 per side, max 8-gun broadside.
“Neptune”‘s radical design was classic “firepower over safety” counterexample. After completion, Royal Navy exercises revealed issues, so only 1 built, follow-ons canceled.
Later Royal Navy hasty redesign produced “Giant-class” battleships. “Giant-class”‘ biggest improvement over “Neptune” was not cramming all 5 main turrets on centerline; midships two offset slightly port/starboard for turret protection margin.
But anyway, experimental “Neptune” remained and was caught by airships at today’s Rosyth Port.
60 500-kilogram aerial bombs’ concentrated bombing directly hit 3, 4 near-misses.
Normally 3 500-kilogram bombs insufficient to sink a battleship. But one hit dead center, sliding down main funnel to explode between No.2 and No.3 main turrets.
This spot destroyed main funnel, blast reaching weak rear of back-to-back turrets—in normal naval battle, utterly impossible to hit.
In normal battles, all turrets face enemy; only front, side, or top armor hittable, turret rears safe.
But this attack was top-down plunge. One 500-kilogram bomb severed main funnel at base, penetrating No.2/3 turret weak rear armor.
Turret shell hoists were tightly shut, but 4 shells inside turrets detonated, plus bomb’s deep breach tearing hoist sidewalls and engine room top.
Soon, ammo depots under No.2 and No.3 main turrets exploded; these two turrets with main funnel blasted skyward.
Earth-shaking explosion even sank nearby barges and tugs, stunning all Rosyth Port personnel.
Of 60 heavy bombs, truly fatal was this 1; others just added.
When “Neptune” sank, all airship crew simultaneously cheered.
This one battleship’s cost equaled 12 airships.
Remaining 5 airships’ 30 heavy bombs eventually fell near another battleship in port, unknown “Bellerophon-class” or “St. Vincent-class.”
Only 1 direct hit, on densest superstructure, collapsing aft bridge lookout and aft funnel, but no main hull damage. Superstructure repairs in 3-5 months.
Some of raining bombs missed main target but luckily hit nearby small ships.
Ultimately, 2 small destroyers sunk by near-miss underwater explosions tearing hull underwater protection.
……
The two air raids on the 28th ultimately sank Royal Navy 1 battleship（Neptune）, lightly damaged 1 battleship（later identified as “St. Vincent-class” “Collingwood”）
Sank 4 armored cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 4 destroyers.
After air raids, meritorious personnel promoted, several officers elevated.
Officers sinking “Minotaur-class” armored cruiser shot down and sacrificed in battle, one airship crashing into enemy ship; 32 fallen crew generally posthumously promoted 3 grades, families compensated at promoted rate.
Among survivors, Hugo Speeler’s airship all promoted one grade for singly sinking 1 old armored cruiser.
Captain promoted to major; Hugo Speeler to captain, gaining chance to command airship solo later.
Credit for sinking “Neptune” battleship, after review, deemed L54 airship’s attack decisive first merit; all its crew promoted one grade.
This airship’s lookout officer, former Wilhelmshaven artillery aerial observer Lieutenant Erhard Milch, promoted to captain, gaining solo airship command chance.
After victorious return, squadron up and down richly feasted; airship command decided:
Tomorrow another Harwich Port bombing;
Day after, bomb both Harwich Port and Rosyth Port.
In short, Harwich Port daily, Rosyth Port every two days.
29th Harwich Port bombing still marginally successful; enemies had no countermeasures, but on airship arrival, combat reconnaissance aircraft faster, high guns stricter, prepped to fire on first-class airships approaching.
Port warships almost none at moor; even diverting to nearby like Great Yarmouth yielded no bargains.
Ultimately, random small bomb spray sank 1 light cruiser, 1 destroyer, then returned.
30th third Harwich Port bombing and second Rosyth Port bombing very poor results.
Harwich Port raid sank only 1 more destroyer, destroyed several supply ships, oilers. Rosyth Port raid followed up on already damaged urgently repairing “Collingwood” battleship with 2 more 500-kilogram bomb hits.
Still not sunk; at most extended repair from half-year to full year, costing enemies tens of thousands more pounds.
Poor results not just few kills; more critically, enemy AA fire grew fiercer.
Britannia fighters tried mounting all firearms on planes for desperate anti-air sweeps.
Ground artillery even hastily modified warship 102-millimeter secondary guns, makeshift raising elevation.
Even unstable, risking secondary gun damage or accidents after few shots, Britannia Navy gunners spared no effort.
Original max-caliber AA guns just 3-inch 76mm; now suddenly 4-inch 102mm, max ceiling naturally rose. Thus 3000-plus or even 4000 meters might not suffice.
At cost of damaging dozens of 102mm secondaries, such AA fire downed 2 more airships.
Worse, on 30th, Rosyth Port-defending combat reconnaissance aircraft group luckily stumbled on new AA ammunition.
Some fighters loaded White Phosphorus Shells and various ammo firearms, desperately spraying all bullet types at airships like last-ditch hail mary—
Perhaps surprising how “White Phosphorus Shells” casually available? But not strange; existed over 200 years.
Historically, using White Phosphorus Shells on airships wasn’t “product” invention but “usage method”—repurposing existing for new effect unexpectedly.
White Phosphorus Shells existed before; no one thought to use on airships.
Now Britannians desperate, throwing everything; lucky trial success unsurprising. Many innovations born from sustained one-sided beatings.
Britannians near-mad these days; all pilots and AA gunners crowdsourcing wisdom, brainstorming.
Even Rolls-Royce Company engineers taught pilots risky engine overload tricks for max climb, to fire as high as possible.
Finally, combined efforts succeeded: 1 airship hit by aircraft-fired White Phosphorus Shells in bombing, becoming fireball plunging into North Sea.
By July 30 Great Bombardment end, 29/30 bombings sank only 1 light cruiser, 2 destroyers, several supply ships, worsened “Collingwood”‘s damage.
Cost 4 airships lost; overall, not profitable—4 airships’ cost equaled 1 light cruiser plus 2 destroyers.
Germania Army gained extra supply ships, oilers, worsened “Collingwood.”
Also, enemy self-inflicted losses: dozen aircraft, dozens AA guns/secondaries— not from airship bombing, but Britannians’ desperate overreach causing mechanical failures/accidents.
Aircraft crashed high-altitude stalls from aggressive illegal climbs to reach airships.
Secondaries damaged from illegal mods, extreme elevation firing accidents.
At this stage, with Britannians knowing “White Phosphorus Shells burn airships” secret, further airship bombing was suicide.
Thus, all bombing operations ended; no more daylight airship missions.
At most, max-ceiling no-precision night bombings, altitude never below 5000 meters.
But night bombing needs dense big targets, so future max another round on London core district.
