Chapter 320: Lin Ran’s Role
“Mr. President, everyone, the professor’s proposal boils down to using your domestic political pressure as a lever. Party divisions and sagging public opinion have you on the edge of stepping down, which instead makes you appear unrestrained on the international stage.
Through simulating nuclear alert, such as sending B-52s close to the Soviet border and hinting at escalation of the Vietnam War through diplomatic channels, we create uncertainty.
From the Department of Defense’s perspective, this is not blind adventure, but realistic calculation based on mutual deterrence.
Our intelligence shows that although Soviet aid accounts for 70% of North Vietnam’s logistics, their global strategic priority is European stability and arms control. They do not want to destroy ‘peaceful coexistence’ with us because of the Vietnam War.
Your domestic situation, with support as low as 35% and party divisions, instead becomes an advantage: it makes Moscow believe you have no political constraints and can escalate without regard for consequences.
This can force them to coordinate pressure on Hanoi for a short-term ceasefire, without us needing to add 100,000 more troops.
The risk is controllable. Simulating a B-52 alert exercise requires only a few days of preparation, and history like the Cuban Missile Crisis proves that such uncertainty often leads opponents to back down.
Of course, we need to closely monitor their response to avoid misjudgment.
The professor’s idea is not pie in the sky, but a precise result based on realistic calculation. In the past, the professor has countless times proven his insight into diplomacy and national defense. I absolutely trust the professor’s judgment!”
After McNamara finished, he added: “Just as you previously humiliated Kosygin with a paper airplane, and he tolerated it, the logic behind it is the same. The Soviet Union fears direct war more than we do.”
Data and logic—that’s McNamara’s style.
At this time, the Soviet Union also had its own geopolitical dilemmas to worry about, the most important being border tensions to the south and European stability.
Clearly, not everyone buys this trick.
Rusk said with concern: “Mr. President, I respect the professor’s analysis, but this is too close to brinkmanship. The Soviet Union’s Leonard is pushing limited sovereignty to maintain control in Eastern Europe. If we bluff, they may see it as provocation.
Recalling the Cuban Missile Crisis, we had intelligence advantage then, but now the Vietnam War is their backyard aid. We already have initial contact in the Paris negotiations—why not strengthen coordination through diplomatic channels? Creating a ‘madman’ image is very likely to backfire and make allies question us.”
At this time, allies were not as obedient as in later years; France still had some agency.
Rusk held a conservative opinion on Lin Ran’s suggestion.
Because for Dean Rusk, he had long wanted to quit.
Last year, because his daughter married a black NASA employee, Rusk submitted his resignation, which was rejected, but this could not shake the fact that he really did not want to do it anymore.
Wouldn’t it be nice to go back to university to teach, write Cold War memoirs? “Those Things I Did in the White House”—money and leisure, wouldn’t that be great?
As someone who had been chairman of the Rockefeller Foundation, Rusk had fulfilled his life except for not becoming president.
One thing that shows his grace is that during the Vietnam War period, Dean Rusk’s son Richard Rusk was studying political science at Cornell University at the time.
He would bring classmates from Cornell University home; everyone he knew at Cornell opposed the war. They would come to Washington for large-scale anti-war rallies, and they often stayed at Rusk’s house.
When Dean Rusk saw them coming down from upstairs, he would say: “Alright, guys, welcome to stay here, but put your placard signs on the umbrella rack by the front door.”
Rusk now actually realized that the Vietnam War was a mistake; he had a retirement mentality—better to do less than more.
If they really implemented the madman theory, he as Secretary of State would have to become a frequent flyer, shuttling daily between London, Paris, Geneva, and Washington. He was about to step down anyway—why bother with more trouble?
And what if it really led to an accidental discharge?
The brinkmanship that Rusk mentioned, in plain terms, is walking a tightrope.
Rusk was probably the only one among these four who firmly opposed implementing the madman theory.
After he finished speaking, he even thought to himself that if his son Richard Rusk learned that the professor had come up with such an idea, he would be so heartbroken.
McNamara rubbed his forehead, a sense of fatigue flashing through his mind over war data: hundreds of casualties every week, budget deficits swelling.
What he did not know was that these numbers would soon swell even more.
“The Department of Defense’s evaluation shows that the Soviet Union’s S-75 missiles aiding North Vietnam have effectively resisted our bombing, but their global strategy is to avoid direct confrontation.
The Soviet Union can aid without limit, China can keep us from crossing 17th parallel north—they can do that, and we must create bargaining chips out of thin air.
Otherwise, we can never achieve our goals; we cannot even gradually withdraw from North Vietnam and may face a crisp defeat!”
McNamara paused, then added: “The Department of Defense can strictly control the entire process; this can completely serve as a bargaining chip.”
He had not discussed it with Lin Ran, but had keenly captured that Lin Ran was creating bargaining chips out of thin air.
McNamara was an absolute elite in all aspects except being incompetent at battlefield command.
Rostow was much more enthusiastic; he flipped open the memorandum, pointing to Soviet aid data: “Gentlemen, we cannot ignore geopolitical reality.
The Soviet Union and China’s split has already delayed their transportation. If we show determination, they will calculate the cost; aiding North Vietnam is far less important than nuclear risk threatening their homeland.
The professor’s idea has theoretical foundation: linkage policy, linking the Vietnam War with arms control.
The president’s lame-duck crisis is indeed a lever, making Moscow think you have no scruples, thereby pushing them to act as intermediaries.”
Rostow was optimistic inwardly: this could reinforce America’s containment posture and prevent Vietnam War failure from affecting Asian allies.
Rostow’s full name is Walt Whitman Rostow; he was probably the earliest White House senior official to see through the Soviet Union’s nature of bullying the weak and fearing the strong.
During 1951 to 1952, Rostow took on a project named Soviet Weakness Research.
The project was sponsored by the Commonwealth and received strong support from the White House government, aimed at identifying Soviet weaknesses in politics and psychological warfare, with contributions from top Soviet experts and psychological warfare experts.
Subsequently, Rostow led a group of staunch Cold War warriors known as the Quantico Vulnerability Group, releasing a report advocating nuclear coercion against the Soviet Union.
And the sponsor behind these experts was Nelson Rockefeller.
The key viewpoints in this report had a direct impact on the subsequent Cold War.
It listed a sequence of proposals from easy to difficult, attempting to test the Soviet Union’s true intentions in this way.
Recommendations included:
“Push for German unification to test Soviet sincerity, believing this is key to testing Soviet concessions.
Encourage independence of Eastern Europe’s satellite states, believing these satellite states’ dissatisfaction is the Soviet Union’s vulnerability and bleeding point.
Emphasize economic aid and military deterrence in Asia, drive a wedge between China and the Soviet Union, turn Asian countries from the free world’s main problem into assets, and substantially increase investment in underdeveloped Asian countries.”
Yes, this report’s viewpoints were completed in 1952 and released in 1955.
In addition, in 1947, he became assistant executive secretary of the European Economic Commission, participating in the formulation of the Marshall Plan.
In early 1946, Rostow realized that without European unification, German unification would be impossible, and the best path to European unification was technical cooperation in the economic field, not direct diplomatic negotiations.
Rostow’s work on European economic unification caught the attention of then-Deputy Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and eventually the attention of French diplomat Jean Monnet. Thereafter, in 1951, the European Coal and Steel Community was established, and Jean Monnet was hailed as the father of the European Economic Community.
It was precisely such a top-tier geopolitical operator who, after reading Lin Ran’s proposal, realized this was the only solution.
More accurately, creating bargaining chips out of thin air was the only way to resolve the Vietnam War without losing face.
“I absolutely support the professor’s proposal. This strategy not only fits my understanding of the Soviet Union—they 100% dare not escalate the situation.
It’s also because the professor has never failed in the past. We are not doing well in the Vietnam War; we have no reason not to adopt the professor’s proposal.
The hotline in the past has fully proven the professor’s talent in diplomacy; he is so talented, so able to see to the essence of things.
Our current contradiction is that we lack chips to force the Soviet Union to negotiate, lack motivation to force the Soviet Union to urge South Vietnam, and nuclear war destroying the world—that is the most powerful chip!”
After Rostow finished, his face was resolute, his gaze extremely firm, giving Lyndon Johnson an unmistakable signal.
Inwardly, a faint apology surfaced for Humphrey.
Before this meeting, Humphrey had given him a death order: in this small meeting, you must use every means to get Lyndon Johnson to push the professor’s proposal, to push the application of the madman theory.
Why?
Because in Humphrey’s view, Lyndon Johnson was already a dead bone in a grave, not worth mentioning. McCarthy and Wallace seemed menacing, but only now—once he entered the race, it would be like sweeping the court clean, sweeping those two into the trash heap.
The only one who could threaten his entry into the White House was Nixon; Fred was a jumping clown. So the madman theory and Nixon’s discourse on resolving the Vietnam War coincided.
But because Nixon would do this in the future, he could not tip it off in advance—tipping it off would let the Soviet Union know, and then it would be useless when the time came.
It was only after reading Lin Ran’s plan that Humphrey realized where Nixon’s information revealed in interviews and his confidence in resolving the Vietnam War came from—it was the madman theory.
So if the White House used this move first, then it would not be Nixon’s trump card but instead a bleeding point in the opponent’s television debate.
Therefore, Humphrey earnestly asked Rostow to convince Lyndon Johnson.
For such an important matter, Vice President Humphrey’s absence to some extent indicated that Lyndon Johnson had developed a rift with him; his ambition had been seen through by Johnson.
Clifford leaned back in his chair, his gaze sweeping over everyone, weighing legal risks in his mind: as a lawyer, he thought from the perspective of international law.
“President, this is a high-risk gamble.
Domestically, Congress and media will see it as recklessness; internationally, the United Nations or allies may condemn it.
But if we base it on intelligence, simulate exercises without actual escalation, it might work.
The key is secrecy and controllability, making the Soviet Union worry without triggering a chain reaction.”
Johnson listened, hands clasped, thoughts surging like tides: everyone here had valid points. Rusk’s caution was the State Department’s style, McNamara’s support showed his unconditional obedience to the professor, and Rostow’s optimism stemmed from his hawkish views.
His own support rate had bottomed out, McCarthy’s 10% support like a thorn in his side—why not turn weakness into strength?
But escalating nuclear deterrence could make the Cold War spiral out of control, affecting global balance.
At this time, the professor’s invincible myth played a decisive role. To this day, every year at the Nobel awards ceremony, past Nobel Peace Prizes are dug up by media for commentary.
No matter from which angle, Lin Ran’s Nobel Peace Prize for the hotline in 1961 is considered one of the most valuable peace prizes.
To this day, it still plays a role in key matters.
Lyndon Johnson finally spoke: “Thank you all.
This is not a rash decision; we need more intelligence evaluation. McNamara and Rostow, prepare detailed plans, including potential Soviet responses.
The meeting ends here.”
Everyone in attendance acknowledged; they knew Lyndon Johnson planned to go all in.
It was also his last shot.
If this failed, his presidential election this year was undoubtedly lost.
Now he was trying to grasp this slim chance.
In the room, everyone stood up, footsteps echoing in the corridor. Johnson sat alone for a moment, staring at the map, his heart still unsettled: is this really the key to ending the war?
However, things did not follow the script set by the White House; they originally wanted to make full preparations before implementing the madman theory.
But on January 30, 1968, North Vietnam’s Tet Offensive swept in like a sudden storm.
North Vietnam launched large-scale offensives simultaneously, attacking Saigon, Hue, and multiple America bases, even briefly storming the America embassy.
In the White House analysis room, frontline intelligence piled up like a mountain.
President Lyndon Johnson stood before the map, face ashen, staring at the real-time television images on the screen: burning streets, fallen soldiers, and news anchor Walter Cronkite’s somber report: “This offensive proves the war’s stalemate.”
Though the offensive was militarily repelled, it caused over 4,000 US Military casualties and struck America homeland directly through media, causing Lyndon Johnson’s public opinion support to plummet to 26%, with anti-war voices in the party surging like McCarthy.
This was not simply a battlefield failure, but a geopolitical turning point: North Vietnam’s resilience relied on Soviet aid, and the offensive exposed America’s vulnerability. Without counterattack, Cold War credibility promises would collapse, giving the Soviet Union more advantage.
Now it was an unprecedented dangerous situation: pushing war polls plummeting, compromise leading to minor Cold War collapse.
Therefore, in the analysis room, Lyndon Johnson wished he could stab McNamara: if not for you insisting on personally going into the field, would we be in such a predicament today?
Lyndon Johnson convened an emergency meeting. On the table in the Oval Office were only two materials: Gallup poll data and evaluations on Soviet aid.
“Everyone,” Johnson began, voice hoarse and weary, “the Tet Offensive has cost us heavy losses.
Domestically, those anti-war people are marching in the streets; even Donkey Party people are turning in congressional budget debates.
The Soviet Union is the behind-the-scenes pusher; they aid Hanoi but are unwilling to get directly involved. We have no time to advance slowly anymore; the professor’s proposal must be implemented right now.”
Lin Ran was prominently present; he nodded: “Mr. President, the reality after the offensive is our lever.
Your support rate has bottomed out, party divisions make reelection hopeless—this instead makes you appear without scruples internationally.
Through simulating nuclear alert, we create uncertainty. Believe me, the Kremlin will rationally calculate the cost.
Make them think the White House is crazy, thereby pressuring North Vietnam for short-term ceasefire, in exchange for linkage on our arms control.”
McNamara said: “It’s time.”
Rusk sighed helplessly.
Rostow said: “Mr. President, we have no time to hesitate anymore!”
Everyone exchanged glances.
Finally, Lyndon Johnson took a deep breath, steeling his resolve inwardly: the offensive’s shock left him no choice; this was not recklessness, but helpless choice—turning weakness into strength might force Moscow to mediate.
This time it was not Lin Ran saying he never failed, but Lyndon Johnson silently praying inwardly that this flag could come true.
Professor, if your invincible record breaks, I’ll have to slink away in disgrace.
“Alright, we implement it. Professor, you as plenipotentiary special envoy, go to Geneva to negotiate; we start deterrence first.”
In mid-February, America began maximum pressure.
The Department of Defense ordered B-52 bombers to conduct simulated nuclear alert exercises over the Pacific Ocean, with paths deliberately approaching the Soviet Far East border, radar signals deliberately leaked.
Johnson hinted in a public speech that “all options are on the table,” without explicitly mentioning nuclear weapons, yet making diplomatic channels boil.
Soviet diplomatic protests followed, but intelligence showed Moscow internally beginning to assess risks: Leonard unwilling to take risks over Vietnam, especially after the offensive, North Vietnam’s boldness exposed logistics limits.
Early March, Lin Ran arrived in Geneva.
Geneva’s early spring scenery could not alleviate the negotiation tension.
Sent to meet Lin Ran in Geneva was Kosygin; he was the moderate among the Soviet Union’s three carriages at the time.
Originally planned to talk with Lyndon Johnson in Gettysburg last year.
Of course, the Soviet side sending Kosygin to talk with Lin Ran was already Secretary of State or president-level treatment.
If the White House sent an ordinary plenipotentiary ambassador, even Rostow, the Soviet Union would at most send Kuznetsov.
Kosygin’s expression was very weary; clearly, he was exhausted by the sudden tension in the nuclear deterrence situation recently.
“Mr. Kosygin,” Lin Ran began, “the situation after the Tet Offensive is already irreversible.
The president’s domestic pressure, including public opinion collapse and party challenges, leaves him without political constraints.
If North Vietnam does not yield, we will consider extreme options. This is not a threat, but reality: Soviet aid sustains Hanoi’s resistance, but escalation risk threatens everyone. Mr. President is already nearly mad.
You know Lyndon Johnson better than I do, what kind of person he is.”
Kosygin listened to this standard Russian, his thoughts momentarily not returning to the negotiation content. If not for the outside sunlight and architectural style reminding him, he would think he was holding a meeting in the Kremlin.
Kosygin lit a cigarette, weighing inwardly: America’s deterrence was probably a bluff, but Johnson’s predicament was real.
The offensive proved North Vietnam’s determination but also exhausted resources.
If they really drove Johnson mad and the situation spun out of control, could the Soviet Union bear such a price?
The Soviet Union’s weakness was on full display at such times.
Just as Rostow, after Lin Ran boarded the special plane leaving Washington, said wistfully to Lyndon Johnson while watching the departing special plane at the airport: “Mr. President, believe me, the Soviet Union will definitely compromise!”
Moments later he repeated: “Definitely! Not compromising is not Soviet.”
Kosygin responded: “Professor, we support North Vietnam’s self-defense, but peace serves common interests.
We can push Paris contacts to prompt Hanoi ceasefire, but the condition is America must promise troop withdrawal and not interfere in Eastern Europe.”
The negotiations were naturally not that simple, lasting a full fifteen days.
In the telegraph to the White House, Lin Ran reported: “They are starting to loosen; the offensive made the Kremlin calculate costs—our pressure is working.”
Subsequently, the Kremlin finally decided to urge Hanoi to ceasefire.
Both sides’ representatives jointly signed a one-year ceasefire agreement in Geneva.
